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INTRODUCTION 
 
This current commentary considers the case of Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v 
the United Kingdom1  (a recent decision of the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR)) and the issues upon which it turns. It raises the question of 
whether an occupying force has an obligation to protect the human rights of 
those under occupation. The inherent tensions, conflicts, contradictions, and 
limits posed in and by such a question are obvious. The occupying force – the 
UK – in this case constituted itself as part of the Multi-National Force (MNF) 
and invaded Iraq in 2003. The invasion and occupation was subsequently held 
to be illegitimate.2 The question of whether Iraqi citizens have a right to 
protection under any International Convention or treaty or any human rights 
instrument is a question of considerable importance and was the question so 
                                                     
∗Professor and Dean of Law, University of Buckingham, Barrister, Door Tenant, 
Clarendon Chambers, 1 Plowden Buildings, Temple, London.  
1 Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v the United Kingdom (Application no. 61498/08) 
judgement 2 March 2010).
2 The war on Iraq was opposed by many NATO members and the so called 
“Operation Iraqi Freedom” was not conducted by NATO. The illegitimacy of the 
action of the US and the UK and the duplicity of its leaders with the fantastic 
subterfuge and lies that accompanied this particular ‘jihad’ has been eloquently 
analysed by Philippe Sands in his book Lawless World (Penguin: London 2006). See 
also Kofi Annan, who in September 2004, publicly stated that the war on Iraq was 
illegal. In November 2004, the senior policy advisor to the Prime Minister 
acknowledged: “we allowed our judgement of the dire consequences of inaction to 
override our judgement of the even more dire consequences of parting from the rule 
of law” see S Wall, The Independent   November 9th 2004 p 31. See also Elizabeth 
Wilmhurst’s resignation on 18th March: “I regret I cannot agree that it is lawful to use 
force....”. 
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considered, in the case of Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi, in the case of Al-Skeini,3 
and whether British forces were so protected was considered in R (Smith) v 
Secretary of State for Defence,4 to which I shall refer later.  
Viewed by Western democratic governments as repugnant (a view 
enshrined as a principle in the laws that bind them) and outlawed by Art 1 
Protocol 13 to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the death 
penalty is the very starting point and paramount consideration for the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in the case of Al-Saadoon and 
Mufdhi.5 This and other rights, including the right to be free from inhuman 
and degrading treatment (Article 3), and the right to a fair trial (Article 6), are 
revered, protected, and regarded as emblematic of the rule of law which is 
proclaimed and cherished by Western democracies. The foreign policy of 
Western democracies, especially its incursions and foraging into other 
territories, is presented by Western governments through the lens of the will 
to liberate, to civilise and to deliver the rule of law. The human rights 
protected by the ECHR enshrine an inalienable code of conduct which the UK 
government wishes to export to non-democratic societies and to the 
developing world. It is this very objective and humanitarian purpose – the 
export of human rights – which the UK government has proclaimed provides 
one of the key justifications for UK foreign policy in the invasion of Iraq.6 
Indeed, using human rights to sell war7 perhaps characterises the position of 
the UK and the US with regard to the invasion of Iraq. It is perhaps worth 
noting, at this point, the words of George Orwell: 
 
“In our time, political speech and writing are largely the defence of the 
indefensible. Things like the continuance of British rule in India, the 
Russian purges and deportations, the dropping of atom bombs on 
Japan, can indeed be defended, but only by arguments which are too 
brutal for most people to face, and which do not square with the 
professed aims of political parties. Thus political language has to 
consist largely of euphemism, question-begging and sheer cloudy 
vagueness... When there is a gap between one’s real and one’s 
                                                     
3 R (on the application of Al-Skeini and others) v Secretary of State for Defence  
[2007] UKHL 26, [2007] 3 All ER 685. 
4 R (Smith) v Secretary of State for Defence Jun 10[2010] UKSC 29.  
5 See above n 3 para 115. 
6 N Chomsky Power and Terror (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) p 37: “Every 
time Blair or Bush or Clinton or Madeleine Albright or someone calls for war on Iraq, 
they always say it the same way. They say, [T]his is the worst monster in history. 
How can we allow him to exist? He even committed the ultimate crime: he used gas 
“against his own people.”  How can such a person exist?”  
7 J Bricmont  Humanitarian Imperialism: Using Human Rights to Sell War (New 
York Monthly Review Press, 2007). 
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declared aims, one turns as it were instinctively to log words and 
exhausted idioms...Political language – and with variations this is true 
of all political parties, from Conservatives to Anarchists – is designed 
to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable...”8
 
It is also significant that the war on Iraq was presented by the UK and the 
USA as a quest and mission to assist the national liberation struggle.9 At the 
same time as these hallowed reasons for the invasion of Iraq, Stephen Poole in 
his critique reveals how language is instrumental in masking the truth.10 
Whilst Philippe Sands QC unmasks the reality.11
The urgent question which this current commentary considers is whether 
Iraqi citizens, who are alleged to have been involved in the deaths of two 
British soldiers during the occupation of Iraq by British and American forces 
(the MNF)12 – the Al-Saadoon case – are entitled to protection and basic 
human rights, inter alia, the rights enshrined in the ECHR. This is considered 
alongside two further questions, the first is whether Iraqi civilians killed by 
the British forces are entitled to ECHR protection – the Al-Skeini case, and the 
second is whether British soldiers on active service outside the UK are 
entitled to the protection of the ECHR – the Smith case. Such a question is 
considered within the existing framework of legal principles of international 
law, and international criminal justice but it is as much a moral question as it 
is a legal one. 
8 G Orwell “Politics and the English Language” George Orwell: Essays (London: 
Penguin, 2000) pp 348-360. See also S Poole Unspeak (London Little Brown, 2006) p 
5. 
9  Bush euphemistically called the invasion of Iraq “Operation Iraqi Freedom”. See 
also, G Stedman Jones “The History of US Imperialism” in R Blackburn (ed) 
Ideology in Social Science (London Fontana, 1976): “Many illusions about the 
historical development of the United States derive from a failure to appreciate its 
underlying continuity. The non-territorial nature of US imperialism during some 
important periods obscured this fact and allowed many historians to represent the 
United States as a champion of national liberation.” p 207.  
10 See Poole above n 8. 
11 See Sands above n 2 especially Chapter 8 entitled “Kicking Ass in Iraq.” 
12 The Multi-National Force – Iraq (MNF-I) was led by the US, it was a military 
command which claimed to be responsible for “Operation Iraqi Freedom”. The 
objectives, were expressed in June 2004 in an annex to UNSCR 1546, in which U.S. 
Secretary of State Powell in a letter to the UN Security Council, stated, “The MNF 
under unified command is prepared to continue to contribute to the maintenance of 
security in Iraq, including by preventing and deterring terrorism and protecting the 
territory of Iraq. The goal of the MNF will be to help the Iraqi people to complete the 
political transition and will permit the United Nations and the international 
community to work to facilitate Iraq’s reconstruction.” 
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THE INVASION OF IRAQ 
 
“On 20 March 2003 a coalition of armed forces, the ‘MNF’, led by the 
United States of America with a large force from the United Kingdom 
and smaller contingents from Australia and Poland, commenced the 
invasion of Iraq.13 ...The United States and the United Kingdom 
thereafter became occupying powers within the meaning of Section III 
of the Hague Regulations on the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 
1949 and the Fourth Geneva Convention on the Protection of Civilians 
in Time of War, 1949.”14  
 
The British government’s proclaimed reasons for the invasion of Iraq 
were that (1) Saddam Hussein was developing “weapons of mass 
destruction”, (2) there was a need both to promote democracy in Iraq and (3) 
to challenge Saddam Hussein’s human rights record. In claiming to bring 
human rights to Iraq, the occupiers, inevitably, set themselves up as 
champions of human rights protection with the consequence that, because of 
their own high grounded claims and promises, their human rights example in 
Iraq was up for scrutiny and examination, both legally and morally. This 
invasion which some would argue is a demonstration of human rights 
imperialism is an aspect to which I shall return later. 
 
The Deaths of British soldiers and the Iraqi suspects 
 
On, or about, March 23rd 2003, Staff Sergeant Simon Cullingworth and 
Sapper Luke Allsopp, two British soldiers serving in Iraq, were abducted and 
killed by Iraqi Militia forces. Faisal Attiyah Nassar Khalaf Al-Saadoon and 
Khalef Hussain Mufdhi were suspected of involvement in the killings. From 
2003 to December 2008 Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi and former senior officials 
of the Ba’ath party were detained pending investigation and trial in a British 
run detention facility – the “Divisional Temporary Detention Facility” – and 
from April 20th 2008 until December 2008 they were detained in the 
“Divisional Internment Facility” again, under British detention. Following the 
Iraqi Council of Ministers’ Resolution (50/2008 of 23 December 2008), all 
occupying forces were to withdraw from Iraq no later than July 31  2009. 
From 2003 to 
st
May 21st 2006 the British authorities classified Al-Saadoon and 
Mufdhi as “security internees” on the basis of resolution 1546, and after May 
21st 2006 and until December 31st 2008, reclassified them as “criminal 
13 Fourth Section Case of Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v The United Kingdom 
(Application no. 61498/08 Judgement 2 March 2010. para [10]. 
14 Fourth Section Case of Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v The United Kingdom 
(Application no. 61498/08 Judgement 2 March 2010. para [11]. 
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detainees”. On December 27th, 2007, the Iraqi authorities (the Iraq High 
Tribunal (IHT))15 formally requested the British forces to transfer them into 
its custody and from this moment they were detained by British forces at the 
‘behest’ of the Iraqi government.  
The applicants, did not wish for this transfer from British into Iraqi 
custody because, since Iraq had reintroduced the death penalty in 2004, they 
feared they would be executed following an order from an Iraqi court, if they 
were found guilty of any involvement with the killings. Represented by Public 
Interest Lawyers,16 Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi on June 12th 2008, issued judicial 
review proceedings in the UK, challenging the legality of the proposed 
transfer.  
Their application raised important legal matters of UK jurisdiction in Iraq 
as to (1) whether the UK, as one of the occupying forces, had an obligation 
and duty to ensure  that Iraqi citizens were protected by law, and (2) whether 
the law of the  ECHR extended to them. Their application for judicial review 
was refused. They appealed this decision to the Court of Appeal on 29th, 30th 
December 2008, and January 21st 2009. The Court of Appeal was required to 
consider whether the two men, whose status was first as persons arrested by 
British forces in Iraq having been suspected originally of orchestrating 
violence against the coalition forces and detained as security internees before 
being reclassified as criminal detainees and then placed under the authority of 
an Iraqi court, were persons who were eligible for the protection under the 
ECHR. The Court of Appeal concluded that the UK government were under 
no such obligation to afford the men protection under the ECHR since they 
had been transferred into the control of the Iraq authorities. Following this 
decision, the British government defied the Strasbourg injunction issued on 
December 30th 2008, which prohibited the transfer of the two men until 
further notice, under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court,17 and in breach of this 
injunction transferred the applicants into the control of the Iraqi government.18   
15 In 2003, a special court–the Iraq Domestic Tribunal–was established in Iraq to hear 
crimes committed by the previous regime and was created by a national statute from 
the Interim Governing Council. In 2005, it was ratified and renamed as the Iraq High 
Tribunal by the Iraqi Transitional National Assembly. Its statute provides jurisdiction 
for certain international crimes committed by Iraqi’s during the Ba’athist regime – 
July 1968 to May 2003. 
16 PIL – “Public Interest Lawyers is a leading public law firm specialising in domestic 
and international human rights and environmental and planning law. In recent years 
we have brought on behalf of our clients many of the seminal judicial review cases in 
these areas.”  
http://www.publicinterestlawyers.co.uk/cases/cases.php?id=126 
17 Rule 39 (Interim measures) “1. The Chamber or, where appropriate, its President 
may, at the request of a party or of any other person concerned, or of its own motion, 
indicate to the parties any interim measure which it considers should be adopted in the 
CURRENT COMMENTARY 
 
 
 150
                                                                                                                              
Their lawyers lodged an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal 
to the ECtHR challenging the legality of the transfer from British into Iraqi 
custody and the resulting abrogation of Convention rights with regard to their 
suffering as a result of their uncertain status prior to trial and their fear of 
execution which was a real possibility, if not a certainty, should they be found 
guilty at trial or on appeal. On May 26th 2009, Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi faced 
trial in an Iraqi court (IHT)19 for their alleged involvement in the killing of the 
two British soldiers. Prosecution witnesses recanted their original statements, 
and in September of that year20 charges against them were dismissed on 
grounds of insufficient evidence. The Court said however that they had not 
been found innocent and could be retried within 12 months should evidence 
be found against them. The prosecutors appealed and the two men were then 
further remanded in custody pending an appeal hearing.  
In May 2010, the ECtHR, in reversing the decision of the Court of 
Appeal, found that the applicants did indeed fall within the jurisdiction of the 
ECHR because they were in the custody of the British forces at the relevant 
time – the time of their arrest: and once arrested they were then entitled to 
protection throughout the duration of the judicial process, and were  “at real 
risk of being subjected to an unfair trial followed by execution by hanging” 
 
interests of the parties or of the proper conduct of the proceedings before it. 2. Notice 
of these measures shall be given to the Committee of Ministers. 3. The Chamber may 
request information from the parties on any matter connected with the implementation 
of any interim measure it has indicated”. See Court Européenne des droits de 
l’homme. European Court of Human Rights, Rules of Court (July 2009) Registry of 
the Court, Strasbourg. 
18 Public Interest lawyer, Phil Shiner said in response to the ECtHR ruling in March 
2010, with regard to the UK’s breach of the original injunction of the ECtHR not to 
transfer the two men, “It is a national disgrace that our government, in breach of an 
injunction by the European court, was prepared to hand our clients to the Iraqi 
authorities when they knew full well that they faced the real risk of being executed by 
hanging,” (Morning Star March 3rd 2010). It is to be noted also that this is the first 
time the UK Government has acted in breach of an injunction issued by the European 
Court. Phil Shiner went on,  “It beggars belief that a Labour government should act in 
such flagrant disregard for the rule of law and to have put two fingers up to the 
European Court in the process." He went even further and accused the MoD of a 
“vindictive” and “flagrant disregard for the rule of law”, arguing that this case is 
“about fundamental principles – the right to life and the prohibition of torture.”   
19 UPI NewsTrack Top News May 26th 2009. 
20 Defence minister, Bob Ainsworth took the view that the Government had taken the 
right course of action and said, “We had been put in an extraordinary position with 
this injunction. They were effectively asking us to do something illegal. We have no 
legal powers to hold these individuals. It is the right decision that they face trial in 
Iraq where these crimes were committed.” (The Independent January 1st 2009).  
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and had been “subjected to mental suffering caused by the fear of execution 
amounting to inhuman treatment” whilst in detention.  
Let us consider in some detail the jurisprudence and reasoning of the 
British courts and the jurisprudence and reasoning of the ECtHR on these 
overarching questions. 
 
BRITISH COURTS AND A NARROW VISION OF 
JURISDICTION 
 
The Divisional Court 
 
The case of Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi first came before a British court with 
regard to challenging, via a judicial review, the decision to transfer them into 
Iraqi control on June 12th 2008. The Divisional Court (Richards LJ and Silber 
J), in giving judgement on December 19th 2008,21 concluded that their 
proposed transfer into Iraqi control was indeed lawful. The applicants claimed 
that a transfer into Iraqi custody would place them, if convicted, as I have 
already pointed out, under risk of execution by hanging, and that this would 
violate not only their rights under the ECHR but also would be contrary to the 
free-standing principles of public international law condemning the death 
penalty. On the jurisdictional question, the Divisional Court concluded that 
there was no real risk of them being treated in any way contrary to 
international norms and that therefore, there was no justification for the UK 
not to transfer them. In fact, they went further and concluded that international 
law positively required them to transfer the applicants into the custody of the 
Iraqi court. In arriving at this conclusion they applied the test in R (B) v 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs which held:  “that 
the authorities of the receiving state can require surrender of a fugitive in 
respect of whom they wish to exercise the authority that arises from territorial 
jurisdiction.”22 They also considered Munaf v Geren,23 a decision of the US 
Supreme Court, which raised a similar question in respect of US jurisdiction. 
In adopting a restrictive and archaic view of jurisdiction, the Supreme Court 
said:   
 
“The habeas petitioners do not dispute that they voluntarily traveled to 
Iraq, that they remain detained within the sovereign territory of Iraq 
21 [2008] EWHC 3098 (Admin), [2008] All ER (D) 246 (Dec). 
22 [2008] EWHC 3098 (Admin), [2008] All ER (D) 246 (Dec) para [69]. 
23[2008] EWHC 3098 (Admin), [2008] All ER (D) 246 (Dec) para [23].  See also 
 Supreme Court of the United States Syllabus Munaf  et al v Geren, Secretary of  the 
Army, et al. Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit No 06–1666. Argued March 25th  2008 – Decided June 12th  2008* 
CURRENT COMMENTARY 
 
 
 152
                                                     
today, or that they are alleged to have committed serious crimes in 
Iraq. Indeed, Omar and Munaf both concede that, if they were not in 
MNF–I custody, Iraq would be free to arrest and prosecute them under 
Iraqi law. Further, Munaf is the subject of ongoing Iraqi criminal 
proceedings and Omar would be but for the present injunction. Given 
these facts, Iraq has a sovereign right to prosecute them for crimes 
committed on its soil, even if its criminal process does not come with 
all the rights guaranteed by the Constitution, see Neely v. Henkel, 180 
U. S. 109, 123. As Chief Justice Marshall explained nearly two 
centuries ago, “[t]he jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory 
is necessarily exclusive and absolute.” Schooner Exchange v. 
McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116, 136. This Court has twice applied that 
principle in rejecting claims that the Constitution precludes the 
Executive from transferring a prisoner to a foreign country for 
prosecution in an allegedly unconstitutional trial. Wilson, supra, at 
529–530; Neely, supra, at 112–113, 122.”  
 
On the fair trial point, the Divisional Court concluded that there was no 
risk that they would not receive a fair trial (Article 6 ECHR) and said, “the 
evidence before us falls a long way short of establishing substantial grounds 
for believing there to be a real risk that a trial of the claimants would involve a 
“flagrant breach” of the principles guaranteed by article 6. Thus, even if the 
Convention were to apply in the normal way, we would reject the claim that 
transfer of the claimants into the custody of the IHT would be contrary to 
article 6.”24 (I will return to discuss the threshold of “flagrant breach” later). 
In concluding that the proposed transfer would be lawful the Court did say: 
 
“Whilst we have been led to that conclusion by our analysis of the 
legal principles and the factual evidence, we are seriously troubled by 
the result, since on our assessment the claimants, if transferred, will 
face a real risk of the death penalty in the event that they are convicted 
by the Iraqi court. In all normal circumstances the Convention (as well 
as the Extradition Act 2003 in extradition cases) would operate to 
prevent such a result. It arises here only because of the highly 
exceptional circumstances of the case and the application to them of 
the principles in R (B) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and 
24 [2008] EWHC 3098 (Admin), [2008] All ER (D) 246 (Dec). Cited in the EHCR 
judgement Al-Saadoon and another v United Kingdom (App No 61498/08) [2010] at 
para [59]. 
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Commonwealth Affairs, as we have understood the judgement of the 
Court of Appeal in that case....” 25
 
The Divisional Court, in their reasoning however, drew a distinction 
between the case of Al-Saadoon and Al-Skeini26 and said that in the Al-Skeini 
case the ECHR jurisdiction applied because no sovereign government existed 
in Iraq at the time of the killing of Baha Mousa by British forces, whereas in 
the case of Al-Saadoon there was indeed a government in office in 2008, the 
time deemed by the court to be the relevant time.  Let us then turn to the facts 
of Al-Skeini27 which is a test case brought by the families of six victims, from 
a very much larger number of claims. The question of the ambit of ECHR 
protection was considered by the House of Lords, (Lord Bingham of Cornhill, 
Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, Baroness Hale of Richmond, Lord Carswell and 
Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood). In this case, five Iraqi citizens were 
shot by British troops in the streets or in their homes in Basra, which the UK 
occupied. Hazim Jum’aa Gatteh Al-Skeini was attending a funeral and was 
shot dead by a British soldier on August 4th 2003. Hannan Mahaibas Saeed 
Shmailawi was with her husband and family at the Institute of Education in 
Basra when the building was fired on by British forces. She was shot dead. 
Muhammad Abdul Ridha Salim was at his brother-in-law’s house when a 
soldier fired a rifle into his stomach causing his death. Waleed Fayayi 
Muzban was driving home from work when British soldiers fired at him from 
behind causing his death. Raid Hadi Sabir Al Musawia, in his role as a 
policemen, was taking a box of “suggestions and complaints” to a judge’s 
house, when he was shot dead by a British patrol. The House of Lords 
considered all these five victims to be “outside the jurisdiction” for the 
purposes of Article 1 of the Convention confirming what had previously been 
25 [2008] All ER (D) 246 (Dec)*R (on the application of Al-Saadoon and another) v 
Secretary of State for Defence [2008] EWHC 3098 (Admin) Para [204]. Cited in the 
EHCR judgement, ibid, at Para [62]. 
26 R (on the application of Al-Skeini and others) v Secretary of State for Defence  
[2007] UKHL 26 [2007] 3 All ER 685. 
27 [2008] 1 AC 153 (per Lord Bingham of Cornhill) “My Lords, ... These proceedings 
arise from the deaths of six Iraqi civilians, and the brutal maltreatment of one of them 
causing his death, in Basra. Each of the deceased was killed (or, in one case, is said to 
have been killed) and the maltreatment was inflicted by a member or members of the 
British armed forces. In each case a close relative of the deceased has applied in the 
High Court in London for an order of judicial review against the Secretary of State for 
Defence, seeking to challenge his refusal (by a letter of 26 March 2004) to order an 
independent enquiry into the circumstances of this maltreatment and these deaths, and 
his rejection of liability to afford the claimants redress for causing them. These six 
cases have been selected as test cases from a much larger number of claims in order, 
at this stage, to resolve certain important and far-reaching issues of legal principle.” 
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held by the Divisional Court and also confirmed on appeal. A sixth person, 
Baha Mousa, who was captured and later tortured and killed in a UK military 
detention facility was however considered to be “within the jurisdiction” for 
the purposes of Article 1, since he had been killed by British troops when he 
was held as a prisoner in a British military detention unit. This was also the 
view of the Divisional Court and the Court of Appeal. Lord Brown of Eaton-
under-Heywood,  in the House of Lords said:  
 
“… I for my part would recognise the UK's jurisdiction over Mr 
Mousa only on the narrow basis found established by the Divisional 
Court, essentially by analogy with the extraterritorial exception made 
for embassies (an analogy recognised too in Hess v United Kingdom 
(1975) 2 DR 72, a commission decision in the context of a foreign 
prison which had itself referred to the embassy X v Federal Republic 
of Germany).”28 
 
Although, Lord Bingham in the House of Lords said: 
 
“I would accordingly hold that the 1998 Act has no extra-territorial 
application. A claim under the Act will not lie against the Secretary of 
State based on acts or omissions of British forces outside the United 
Kingdom. This does not mean that members of the British armed 
forces serving abroad are free to murder, rape and pillage with 
impunity. They are triable and punishable for any crimes they commit 
under the three service discipline Acts already mentioned...”29  
 
The interpretation of “territory” and the obligations of the occupying force 
in Al-Skeini, was of such overriding importance as a matter of principle that 
InterRights submitted a third party intervention jointly with the Bar Human 
Rights Committee, the European Human Rights Advocacy Centre, Human 
Rights Watch, the International Federation for Human Rights, the Law 
Society, and Liberty. Their intervention focused on the issue of the 
extraterritorial application of human rights law, especially the application of 
the European Convention on Human Rights. The interveners argued that a 
narrow interpretation of “jurisdiction” would create double standards and 
observed: 
 
“During the 1930’s and 40’s appalling human rights abuses were 
carried out across Europe by military forces within occupied 
28 Ibid at para 132. 
29 Ibid Lord Bingham of Cornhill para 26 at 704. 
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territories. It is inconceivable in this context that the drafters of the 
Convention, amongst whom were such notables as Pierre-Henri 
Teitgen who had been captured and tortured by the forces of the 
belligerent occupier of France, should have considered that the 
prospective responsibilities of states under the Convention should be 
confined to the violations of human rights perpetrated only within 
their own territories. Such an approach would have meant that states 
could be held accountable for Buchenwald, but not for Auschwitz, and 
not for the extraterritorial reprisals and atrocities carried out by the 
occupying forces that took place in eg Poland, Ukraine, 
Czechoslovakia, Greece, the Netherlands or France.”30
 
Having considered the Al-Skeini judgement, the Divisional Court in Al-
Saadoon concluded that a decision, therefore, not to meet the request of the 
Iraqi government, and to defy the request to transfer the two men into Iraqi 
custody could be regarded as an interference with Iraq’s sovereign 
government.31  
In considering the question of whether a situation falls within the 
jurisdiction of a state for the purposes of Article 1,32 the House of Lords in Al-
Skeini held that the national court should be guided by the decision of the 
Strasbourg court in Bankovic v Belgium.33 In that case, which considered the 
territoriality of NATO forces in Yugoslavia, the court held that only in 
exceptional cases could acts of the contracting states outside their territories 
constitute an exercise of jurisdiction by them within the meaning of Article 1 
of the Convention.34  Although Bankovic does not set out with any clarity 
what an exception might be, the Divisional Court nevertheless followed this 
approach and deemed Al-Saadoon not to be sufficient of an exception.35 
Although it is to be noted that the Bankovic decision has been held in some 
circles to be flawed.36 In Al-Skeini (with regard to the deceased victim Baha 
Mousa) the House of Lords held that Article 6 of the ECHR applies to a 
30 InterRights submission in Al-Skeini see http://www.interights.org/al-skeini 
31 Ibid, [2008] EWHC 3098 (Admin), [2008] All ER (D) 246 (Dec) at para [67]. 
32 Article 1 “The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their 
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention” as per 
ECHR. 
33  Bankovic v Belgium (Application 52207/99) (2001) 11 BHRC 435.  
34 See for a critique of the restrictive interpretation of territory in this case K 
Altiparmak “Bankovic: An Obstacle to the Application of the European Convention 
on Human Rights in Iraq”? Journal of Conflict and Security Law
2004 9 (213).
35 See the relevant case law on this point, Loizidou v Turkey (preliminary objections) 
(1995) 20 EHRR 99, Soering v UK [1989] ECHR 14038/88. 
36 See Altiparmak above n 33. 
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public authority acting outside the territory of the United Kingdom but within 
the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom, within the meaning of article 1 of the 
Convention. Article 1 provides that contracting states shall secure to everyone 
“within their jurisdiction” the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention. 
The Divisional Court in Al-Saadoon relied on the finding of the Divisional 
Court in Al-Skeini which was also approved by the House of Lords in Al-
Skeini:  
 
“It is not at all straining the examples of extraterritorial jurisdiction 
discussed in the jurisprudence considered above to hold that a British 
military prison, operating in Iraq with the consent of the Iraqi 
sovereign authorities, and containing arrested suspects, falls within 
even a narrowly limited exception exemplified by embassies, 
consulates, vessels and aircraft, and in Hess v United Kingdom 2 DR 
72, a prison” and that “[w]e can see no reason in international law 
considerations, nor in principle, why in such circumstances the United 
Kingdom should not be answerable to a complaint, otherwise 
admissible, brought under articles 2 and/or 3 of the Convention.”37
 
Court of Appeal – jurisdiction in Basra? “manifestly absurd” 
 
The applicants, Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi, then appealed the decision of the 
Divisional Court, to uphold the ruling of the IHT, to the Court of Appeal.38 
Before Waller, Laws and Jacob LJJ, their lawyers contended that if the two 
men were transferred into Iraqi custody there were substantial grounds for 
believing that if they were convicted, they would face a real risk of execution 
by hanging.39 In reply to the submission, advanced on their behalf, that 
execution by hanging was generally condemned by the law of nations, the 
Court of Appeal said that: “No freestanding rule of regional customary 
international law of non-refoulement by European states to third countries 
where the death penalty might be carried out existed.”40
On the territoriality question, the applicants argued that since they had 
been detained by the British forces in Iraq they fell within the jurisdiction of 
the United Kingdom for the purposes of the Convention. They argued that an 
international law question arose with regard to a principle of regional 
37 [2008] All ER (D) 246 (Dec)*R (on the application of Al-Saadoon and another) v 
Secretary of State for Defence [2008] EWHC 3098 (Admin) at Para [40] citing the 
Divisional Court in Al-Skeini with reference to Baha Mousa [2007] QB 140, para 287. 
38 R (on the application of Al-Saadoon and another) v Secretary of State for Defence 
[2009] EWCA Civ 7.  
39 See ibid [22], [73], [74] above. 
40 Ibid para [3], [63]. 
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customary law, with regard to whether hanging was regarded as a crime 
against humanity and/or inhuman or degrading treatment. On the 
jurisdictional question, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the 
Divisional Court, and, although using rather more elaborate and diffuse 
language, said that whilst having no “sharp edge” jurisdiction was a concept 
and reality derived from “strategic rather than lexical thinking.”41 The Court 
of Appeal said that the scope of the ECHR was “the ‘espace juridique’ of the 
states parties”42 thereby endorsing the so-called ‘espace juridique’ principle.43 
In considering, in the words of Laws LJ, “whether the ECHR writ runs, so to 
speak, to the British base in Basra,”44 the Court of Appeal concluded that it 
did not! In essence, what this means is that the construct of jurisdiction relies 
on a conservative model of territory conceived as an organic enterprise, and in 
this regard the Court of Appeal appealed to an understanding of “natural 
setting.” Laws LJ went further and asserted that the argument that the ECHR 
had any ambit in Basra was “manifestly absurd”. As he pointed out: 
 
“The essentially regional nature of the Convention is relevant to the 
way that the court operates. It has judges elected from all the 
contracting states, not from anywhere else. The judges purport to 
interpret and apply the various rights in the Convention in accordance 
with what they conceive to be developments in prevailing attitudes in 
the contracting states. This is obvious from the court's jurisprudence 
on such matters as the death penalty, sex discrimination, 
homosexuality and transsexuals. The result is a body of law which 
may reflect the values of the contracting states, but which most 
certainly does not reflect those in many other parts of the world. So 
the idea that the United Kingdom was obliged to secure observance of 
all the rights and freedoms as interpreted by the European Court in the 
utterly different society of southern Iraq is manifestly absurd.”45
 
The Court of Appeal followed established law where standards and 
principles have already been diluted in respect of some applicants and not 
41 Ibid para [37]. 
42 Ibid para [39]. 
43 See  R Wilde, “The ‘legal space’ or ‘espace juridique’ of the European Convention 
on Human Rights: is it relevant to extraterritorial state action”? European Human 
Rights Law Review (2005) 10, 2 115-124. See also “The British Military in Iraq - 
applicability of the espace juridique doctrine” [2005] PL 448, S Miller “Revisiting 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: A Territorial Justification for Extraterritorial...” 
European Journal of International Law (2009) 20 1223-1246. 
44 Ibid para [15]. 
45 Ibid para [78]. 
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others. For example, on the question of “real risk” of hanging, the Court of 
Appeal queried whether “real risk” was actually the test applicable in “so 
called foreign cases,” accepting that in such cases the extent of the risk had to 
be not merely “real” but “flagrant,”46 albeit concluding however, that the 
standard of proof is that of real risk.47   Such a distinction between the extent 
of the risk required and its threshold of “flagrant”, with a standard of proof at 
the threshold of “real risk” is difficult if not impossible to articulate, 
comprehend, or divine, creating a parallel standard for human rights in  so 
called foreign cases. The approach of the British courts to the jurisdictional 
question, in my view, can only be said to be “making the world a safer place 
for hypocrisy.”48   
Immediately following the decision of the Court of Appeal, the European 
Court issued an injunction to prohibit the transfer, notwithstanding, the two 
men were handed over to the Iraqi authorities. Their legal team asserted with 
some dismay, “They were transferred despite the court injunction, the lack of 
evidence against them, the unpredictable and highly political nature of the 
IHT proceedings and the very real risk that a death sentence would be 
imposed.”49 
Human Rights imperialism 
 
Laws LJ, in invoking a novel concept, went on to say that interference of 
the kind desired by the applicants would put the court in a position which 
“would run the risk not only of colliding with the jurisdiction of other human 
46 It is to be observed that protection and justice as applied to foreign nationals, 
‘foreign cases’, so called, and in this case to occupied peoples, demonstrates two tiers 
of human rights as practiced.  For example, in considering a decision to deport from 
the UK, the UK courts must consider whether any person deported will face the risk 
of torture or inhuman treatment, or an unfair trial. The acid test with regard to their 
rights under article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights is that 
deportation will expose them to a “real risk” of torture or inhuman treatment. With 
regard to fair trial under article 6, the litmus test is that there is a real possibility that  
trial in another country will be a “flagrant breach” or a real risk of a “total denial of 
the right to a fair trial.” These higher bars of real risk of torture (article 3) and total 
denial of fair trial (article 6) were upheld in the House of Lords decision in the case of 
Mr. Othman (Abu Qatada, February 18th 2009 RB (Algeria) v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department; U (Algeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department; 
Othman v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] UKHL 10, [2009] 4 All 
ER 1045).
47 Ibid para [16]. 
48 T Wolfe Look Homeward Angel 1920 (London: Penguin Edition 1990). 
49 http://www.publicinterestlawyers.co.uk/cases/cases.php?id=126 accessed July 2nd
2010. 
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
 
 
 159
                                                     
rights bodies but of being accused of human rights imperialism.”50 With the 
greatest respect, I cannot agree with Laws LJ. Human rights organisations 
widely and broadly were concerned that the men would face the death penalty 
and given the fact of their broad and wide involvement and concern rather 
than collision, they appeared united. Indeed, the many human rights groups 
that joined the case as interveners is a testament to the very broad  support 
these men  and/or the principles involved in their case secured.  
Of course there is a problem of human rights imperialism, but it is not an 
issue in my view with respect to the right to protection of Al-Saadoon and 
Mufdhi from the death penalty. Human rights imperialism, certainly 
characterises the invasion of Iraq by foreign powers. Human rights 
imperialism is evident for example, in the way in which claims to universalist 
principles are hollow since the human rights instruments,  are drafted largely 
by the West, and therefore are characterised by ‘ethnocentricism’ or 
‘anthropocentricism’ on the one hand and, by ‘orientalism’ or ‘cultural 
imperialism’51 on the other. Perhaps this problem and limitation is best 
articulated by Sardar, who writes: 
 
“There is, …nothing ‘natural’ about human rights … just as 
democracy is a cynical ploy for post modernising the non-west, 
human rights too have become an instrument for promoting the 
western agenda…. The western liberal notion of human rights, 
which is the basis for the UN Declaration of Human Rights, reduces 
the issue of the rights of human beings simply to preserving the 
civil liberties of individuals and provides a moral high ground for 
these rights to be imposed, by coercion if necessary, on all non-
western and by definition illiberal, people.”52
 
Ethnocentricism or anthropocentricism characterises the way in which 
human rights reflect Western values53 (and the way in which the West 
becomes the template for the world. Said in Culture and Imperialism,54 
argues that the British, French and American imperial experience had a 
unique cultural centrality creating what he calls a “totalizing discourse.”55 It 
is this “totalising discourse” which is demonstrated in the invasion and 
50 Ibid para [78] 
51 D L Donoho, “Relativism Versus Universalism in Human Rights: The Search for 
Meaningful Standards” 27 Stan.J.International L. 345,353 (1991). 
52 Z Sadar Postmodernism and the Other (London: Pluto, 1998) p 67. 
53 J A M Copbbah “African Values and the Human Rights Debate: An African 
Perspective” 9 Human  Rights Quarterley 309 (1987). 
54 E Said Culture and Imperialism (London: Vintage, 1994) p xxv. 
55 Ibid xxvii. 
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occupation of Iraq. Such “civilising” projects resonate of the crusaders jihad 
against Saledin.56 Samir Amin calls this contemporary “project” an 
expression of “eurocentricism.”57 These narratives masquerade as high 
theory and  define the constructs of human rights, which, as Pollis and 
Schwab write: 
 
“(is) a twentieth-century concept … embedded in the United Nations 
(which) can be traced to the particular experiences of England, 
France and the United States…. Thus to argue that human rights has 
a standing which is universal in character is to contradict historical 
reality. What ought to be admitted by those who argue universality is 
that human rights as a Western concept based on natural right should 
become the standard upon which all nations ought to agree, 
recognising, however, that this is only our particular value 
system.”58
 
But it is not, in my view eurocentric or ethnocentric to resist the 
imposition of the death penalty wherever it lurks in the world. 
 
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS - THE WILL TO DO 
JUSTICE 
 
On December 22nd 2008, an application (no. 61498/08), against the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland was made which alleged that 
the detention and transfer of Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi gave rise to violations of 
their rights under articles 2, 3, 6, 13 and 34 of the Convention and Article 1 of 
Protocol No. 13. On December 30th 2008, the Acting President of the Section 
granted the applicants request, under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, for an 
interim measure. In spite of this, on December 31st the two men were 
transferred into Iraqi custody.  On February 17th 2009, their case was given 
priority under Rule 41.59 On March 20th 2009 the Equality and Human Rights 
Commission was granted leave to intervene as a third party.60 Also granted 
leave to intervene on March 25th 2009, were the Bar Human Rights 
Committee of England and Wales, British Irish Rights Watch, the European 
56 T Ali The Book of Saledin Islam Quintet  2 (London: Verso, 1999). 
57 S Amin Eurocentricism (London: Zed Press, 1989)  p 106. 
58 A Pollis and P Schwab (eds) Human Rights: Cultural and Ideological Perspectives 
(New York: Praeger Publishers Inc, 1980) p 4.  Cited in  S Poulter Ethnicity, Law and 
Human Rights (Oxford: Clarenden, 1990) p 109. 
59 Rule 41 Requests for priority pursuant to Rule 41 of the Rules of Court of the 
European Court of Human Rights. 
60 Article 36 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 44 § 2. 
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Human Rights Advocacy Centre, Human Rights Watch, the International 
Commission of Jurists, the International Federation for Human Rights, 
JUSTICE, Liberty and REDRESS (otherwise referred to as “the group of 
interveners”). On June 30th 2009, the applicants case was heard before L. 
Garlicki, President, and Judges Sir Nicolas Bratza, G. Bonello, L. Mijovic; J. 
Sikuta, M. Poalelungi and N. Vucinic.61 On February 2nd 2010, having 
deliberated in private, the Court delivered its judgement. The judges took as 
their starting point (Protocol no 13),62 which states that convicted persons 
have a  right  not to be subjected to the death penalty and they pointed out that 
this right enshrines one of the basic values of  democratic societies. They went 
on to say that the principles underlying the Convention cannot be interpreted 
and applied in a vacuum, therein very much embracing a “living instrument” 
approach to the Convention.63 In taking at the centre a fundamental objection 
to the death penalty they held, “it is not open to a Contracting State to enter 
into an agreement with another State which conflicts with its obligations 
under the Convention.”64 And, therefore took the view that any agreement to 
transfer the men, with its attendant consequences for the men, would conflict 
with convention obligations. They then went on to say that such a principle 
“carries all the more force in the present case given the absolute and 
fundamental nature of the right not to be subjected to the death penalty and 
the grave and irreversible harm risked by the applicants.”65  
On the question of the transfer of the men into Iraqi custody the ECtHR 
said this: 
 
“The majority of the Chamber have found the Government's non-
compliance with the Rule 39 indication to be unjustified on two 
principal grounds. It is said that there was no ‘objective impediment’ 
to compliance with the interim measures since the absence on 31 
December 2008 of any available course of action consistent with 
respect for Iraqi sovereignty other than the transfer of the applicants 
was of the respondent State’s own making. Secondly, it is said that the 
Government have not satisfied the Court that they took all reasonable 
steps, or indeed any steps, to seek to comply with the Rule 39 
indication, not having informed the Court of any attempt to explain 
the situation to the Iraqi authorities or to reach a temporary solution 
                                                     
61 Fourth Section Case of Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v The United Kingdom 
(Application no 61498/08 Judgement 2 March 2010.
62 Ibid para [118]. 
63 Ibid para [126]. 
64 Ibid para [138]. 
65 Ibid. 
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which would have safeguarded the applicants’ rights until the Court 
had completed its examination.”66
 
In approaching this question the ECtHR considered the obligations of the 
ECHR as prospective and forward looking and not fixed in one moment in 
time or place, very much looking to the end of the justicial process.  They said 
this: “the Court considers that the respondent State was under a paramount 
obligation to ensure that the arrest and detention did not end in a manner 
which would breach the applicants’ rights under Articles 2 and 3 of the 
Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 13.”67
The ECtHR concluded: 
 
“[143] In summary, therefore, the Court considers that, in the absence 
of any such binding assurance, the referral of the applicants’ cases to 
the Iraqi courts and their physical transfer to the custody of the Iraqi 
authorities failed to take proper account of the United Kingdom’s 
obligations under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention and Article 1 of 
Protocol No. 13 since, throughout the period in question, there were 
substantial grounds for believing that the applicants would face a real 
risk of being sentenced to death and executed.[144] The outcome of 
the applicants’ case before the IHT is currently uncertain. While the 
applicants remain at real risk of execution since their case has been 
remitted for reinvestigation, it cannot at the present time be predicted 
whether or not they will be retried on charges carrying the death 
penalty, convicted, sentenced to death and executed. Whatever the 
eventual result, however, it is the case that through the actions and 
inaction of the United Kingdom authorities the applicants have been 
subjected, since at least May 2006, to the fear of execution by the 
Iraqi authorities. The Court has held above that causing the applicants 
psychological suffering of this nature and degree constituted inhuman 
treatment. It follows that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the 
Convention.”... [171]. In the present case, the Court has found that 
through the actions and inaction of the United Kingdom authorities the 
applicants have been subjected to mental suffering caused by the fear 
of execution amounting to inhuman treatment within the meaning of 
Article 3. While the outcome of the proceedings before the IHT 
remains uncertain, that suffering continues. For the Court, compliance 
with their obligations under Article 3 of the Convention requires the 
Government to seek to put an end to the applicants’ suffering as soon 
66 Ibid: Partly dissenting opinion of Judge Bratza at para [13], although he said that he 
was not convinced by either of these two arguments at para [14]. 
67 Ibid para [140]. 
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as possible, by taking all possible steps to obtain an assurance from 
the Iraqi authorities that they will not be subjected to the death 
penalty.”68
 
Altiparmak in 2004, in his critique of Bankovic  has said, “The Iraqi war 
might require the ECrtHR to revisit this 'jurisdiction' definition”  that “there 
should not be a shadow of doubt that POWs and civilians under British 
custody in Iraq fall within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom” and “The 
ECtHR will have to redefine 'jurisdiction' if it receives an application from 
someone detained by British forces.”69 The question is has it done so? The war 
on Iraq has indeed provided the ECtHR with the opportunity to revise its 
position on the application of the ECHR in military invasions.  What did the 
ECtHR in Al-Saadoon have to say on jurisdiction? Somewhat surprisingly 
perhaps, the Court said nothing new on jurisdiction in fact it completely 
sidestepped the issue  focusing  exclusively on the ECHR obligations.  In fact 
the ECtHR, has, in the words of Miller,70 “failed clearly to articulate when and 
why signatory states’ extraterritorial actions can be brought within the 
jurisdiction of the European Convention.” The Court said: 
 
“[155] This was, indeed, an exceptional case. If it was correct that the 
relevant acts fell within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom, the case 
was by definition 'exceptional' in terms of the extraterritorial application of 
the Convention (see Banković, cited above, para 74). Further, the 
exceptional nature of the case derived specifically from the fact that the 
United Kingdom was acting or being required to act outside its own 
territory....[162] As stated above, the Court's approach in interpreting the 
Convention must be guided by the fact that its object and purpose as an 
instrument for the protection of individual human beings requires that its 
provisions be interpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards practical 
and effective.” 
 
Judge Bratza, in dissent, however did have something to say on the 
jurisdiction question and adopted a mechanistic approach to jurisdiction 
which followed in the the spirit of the British courts. He said: “While I in no 
way question these general principles laid down in the Court’s case-law, I am 
not persuaded that they have any direct application to the special 
circumstances of the present case, where the two applicants were held by a 
68 Ibid para [143][144][171]. 
69 See Altiparmak above n 34. 
70 S Miller “Revisiting Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: A Territorial Justification for 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction under the European Convention” European Journal of 
International Law 2010 20 4 1223-1246. 
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contingent of a multinational force on foreign sovereign territory, whose 
mandate to remain on that territory had expired and who had no continuing 
power or authority to detain or remove from the territory nationals of the 
foreign sovereign State concerned. It is these considerations which have led 
me to dissent from the majority of the Chamber in their finding that there have 
also been violations of Articles 13 and 34 of the Convention.”71
 
WASHING OUR HANDS OF JURISDICTION  
 
The plight of Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi seemed of limited interest (at least 
at the time of writing) to the world’s press either on the jurisdiction point or 
on the human rights point. The Independent newspaper in the English 
language press and sections of the Arabic press72 were however concerned 
with the long term detention of these men, the conditions of their detention, 
the potential abuse of their human rights, and the wider question of 
jurisdiction in the modern post-colonial73 age. It has been an erstwhile 
principle of law that everyone has the right to representation and the 
protection of the law, a right enshrined in Article 6 of the Convention. And in 
this regard, it is of significance that a formidable group of human rights 
lawyers and activists joined this case as interveners, because of the 
fundamental issues and rule of law upon which this case turned. However, the 
applicant’s right to legal representation out of UK legal aid funds was 
vociferously challenged.74  But, it is to be remembered, as Henry Brougham 
put it:  
 
“An advocate, by the sacred duty which he owes his client, knows in 
the discharge of that office but one person in the world, that client and 
none other. To save that client by all expedient means – to protect that 
client at all hazards and cost to all others, including himself, is the 
highest and most unquestioned of his duties; and he must not regard 
the alarm, the suffering, the torment, the destruction which he may 
bring upon any other. He must go on, reckless of the consequences... 
71 See above n 61. Partly dissenting opinion of Judge Bratza at para [9]. 
72 Website of Ismail Alwan al Tamimi.  
73 I use this term not to suggest that colonialism is over but that we have entered a 
new colonialist era. 
74 Patrick Mercer, MP said: “It seems totally wrong to me that these men are being 
given legal aid. Would we have given legal aid to Nazis who committed war crimes in 
the Second World War – of course not – this is arrant nonsense” S Rayment, and B 
Leach The  Telegraph, November 15th  2008. 
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even if his fate it should unhappily be, to involve his country in 
confusion for his client’s protection.”75
 
The fundamental question at stake was whether these men were entitled to 
the protection of the ECHR, especially, the right if convicted not to be 
executed, and whilst in detention to be free from inhuman and degrading 
treatment, and to receive a fair trial.  
Dancing on the head of the pin of “jurisdiction” allowed both the court of 
first instance and the Court of Appeal, albeit with troubled minds, to wash 
their hands of the protection of these two men, by concluding that they fell 
outside the jurisdiction of the ECHR, and were therefore simply not our 
concern. In addition, applying an organic notion of territory allowed a retreat 
into a conservative model of “natural territory” which disregarded and 
stripped bare the complexity of the context in which this case was framed and 
fixed. This reification excluded the reality and context of the occupation and 
invasion by a foreign power. Such invasions are becoming an increasing 
tendency in the new colonialist era. In my view it is somewhat of a 
conundrum to treat jurisdiction in its ordinary meaning when it is being 
realised in extraordinary circumstances.  
Such arguments were further aided by a rigid notion of what indeed was 
the relevant time, sine the time taken as the relevant time secured the negation 
of their right to protection. The British courts took the recent time and the 
time at which these men were transferred, 2008, as the relevant point. Their 
detention in a previous time frame, prior to 2008, and any obligations to the 
protection of the human rights of the two men whilst held in British custody, 
were excluded. This produced a somewhat illogical and piecemeal outcome 
which, in effect, placed the men beyond humanity’s reach.  
Principles of justice and humanity, the foundation stones of law and one 
of the declared reasons for the British government’s invasion, were 
abandoned, through being subordinated to a fixed model of territory and 
relevant time, thereby ensuring an inevitable outcome. The Divisional Court 
stated that their decision left them “seriously troubled” because if convicted 
the men would face execution, whilst the Court of Appeal found any 
extension of the ECHR to Southern Iraq “manifestly absurd”. Stripped of 
context and hermeneutically sealed off from what was, in fact, happening all 
around the court in this case began to resemble what  Geoffrey Robertson has 
called “slot-machine jurisprudence”.76  
75 Monroe H Freedman Hofstra Law Review 2006 34 4 Summer. See also In re 
Griffiths, 413 US 717, 724 n 14 (1973) (citation omitted). See also Cammer v United 
States, 359 US 399, 405 (1956), in which it was held that lawyers are more than just 
officers of the court “within the conventional meaning of that term”.  
76 G Robertson The Justice Game (London: Chatto and Windus, 1998) p x. 
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THE DIFFERENCE MADE BY TELEOLOGICAL 
INTERPRETATION  
 
By stark contrast, the ECtHR  approached the case from a very different 
vantage point and brought justice and a moral code into sight, translating 
these overarching principles into legal judgement. As  Altiparmak writes, “the 
'object and purpose' of the ECHR has been a crucial factor in the 
interpretation of the Strasbourg organs.”77 The court was faced with a choice 
on the one hand of treating jurisdiction in the ordinary sense but denying the 
reality in which the men found themselves or indeed anyone might find 
themselves in Iraq under occupation, or on the treating jurisdiction in a way 
that took into account the reality of the circumstances and thereby honoured 
the universal aspirations of the Convention. 
The ECtHR ostensibly started out from a natural law position à la Hobbes, 
not of territory but of the commitment and quest for a just and responsible 
law. A position which echoes the sentiments of Lord Acton, “Opinions alter, 
manners change, creeds rise and fall, but the moral law is written on the 
tablets of eternity.”78 They approached the case with a mindset of justice. As 
Douzinas and Warrington, when writing on the essence of a just and 
responsible decision, state – such a decision “must both conserve and destroy, 
or suspend, the law enough to reinvent it and rejustify it in each case. Each 
case requires unique interpretation which no rule can guarantee absolutely. 
But, at the same time, there is no just decision if the judge does not refer to 
law or rule… This is the reason that we cannot say that a judgment is just. A 
decision…Cannot be declared just because justice is the dislocation of the 
said of law by the – unrepresentable-saying of ethics.”79 Indeed, Lord 
Denning himself said, “I must do justice, whatever the law may be.”80
The ECtHR is indeed a living instrument and the need for it to be 
interpreted in the light of contemporary circumstances and context is rooted  
and reflected in its case law. As Altiparmak points out that this principle is 
derived from the nature of the ECHR.81 Effective protection (effet utile) lies at 
its heart requiring application of the provisions to ensure its safeguards are 
practical and effective. 
77 See  Altiparmak above n 34.
78 Cited in J Glover Humanity: a Moral History of the Twentieth Century (London: 
Pimlico, 2001) p 1. 
79 Cited in A Sarat (ed) Law, Violence and the Possibility of Justice (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2002) p 7-8. 
80 G Robertson The Justice Game (London: Chatto and Windus, 1998) p x. 
81 R. Bernhardt “Thoughts on the Interpretation of Human Rights Treaties” in F 
Matscher & H Petzold (eds) Protecting Human Rights: The European Dimension 
(Studies in Honour of Gérard J. Wiarda), (1988) 5 at 68–71. 
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
 
 
 167
                                                     
The vision and reach of the ECHR in ensuring effectiveness is also 
prospective or promissory – a performative utterance.82  As Paul de Mann 
when writing about laws in general terms, “[they] are future-orientated and 
prospective; their illocutionary mode is that of the promise. On the other hand, 
every promise assumes a date on which the promise is made and without 
which it would have no validity; laws are promissory notes in which the 
present of the promise is always a past with regard to its realization.”83  It is in 
this sense that the ECHR is promissory: it promises to protect and secure 
fundamental human rights, and arguably does so from the moment a person 
falls within its reach right up until the end or conclusion of the 
judicial/justicial process. In this regard, once arrested and under British 
jurisdiction, both men were guaranteed henceforth, in both the present and the 
future, human rights protection.  It was therefore this promissory role of the 
ECHR that the ECtHR implicitly relied upon, that is, to ensure the protection 
of Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi until the end or conclusion of that process, 
notwithstanding the fact that in 2008 the British forces were no longer in 
control and an Iraqi government was in situ. The teleological perspective 
applied by the ECtHR enabled new possibilities. It is worth reflecting on the 
construct of “time” in the writings of Avital Ronell who writes, “Justice can 
no longer permit itself to be merely backward looking or bound in servility to 
sclerotic models and their modifications (their “future”). A justice of the 
future would have to show the will to rupture...”.84
And what of the judges? By disclosing two faces of law and two different 
approaches, one legally mechanistic, narrow, and one morally purposive and 
effective, the British courts and the ECtHR have demonstrated the inherent 
tensions within the law, between on the one hand its logic and its rules, and on 
the other hand its justice, played out in a context between international law 
and the ECHR principles. In theorising this dichotomy Robert Cover argues, 
“Because of the violence they command, judges characteristically do not 
create law, but kill it. Theirs is the jurispathic office...Among warring sects, 
each of which wraps itself in the mantle of a law of its own, they assert a 
regulative function that permits a life of law rather than violence.”85 The 
British courts effectively asserted this regulatory function killed human rights 
82 See J  Austin Philosophical Papers (Clarendon:Oxford 1960). J  Austin How to do 
things with Words (Cambridge: Harvard, 1975). 
83 Paul de Mann Allegories of Reading: Fugural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, 
Rilke, and Proust  (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979) p 273. 
84 A Ronell Wars: Literature Addiction Mania (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1992) p 21. 
85 A Sarat (ed) Law, Violence and the  Possibility of Justice (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2002). See also R M Cover “The Supreme Court: A Foreword”1983 
97.4 Harvard Law Review  p 53.  
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law by privileging international law and its vision of territory above the 
potential universal reach of human rights. Cover calls upon judges to be less 
“jurispathic” and to “invite new worlds.”86 The ECtHR judges  clearly see the 
world through the language and concepts of the lens of the ECHR, inviting 
new worlds, and are driven by the will to rupture old ways of thinking with 
purposive and universalist aspirations. 
Reading the judgement of the ECtHR in Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi we are 
also reminded of Drucilla Cornell’s call to re-envision the good87 and her 
concern with the Law of Law. Cornell challenges the indifference of the law, 
an indifference which is produced and allowed by law, and perhaps, 
characterises somewhat the law as applied by the British courts in this case 
albeit that the Court of Appeal did say that it was “seriously troubled” by the 
outcome of their judgement. The consequence of the decision of the British 
courts provides an example of what Sarat calls “law’s violence”, unlike the 
ECtHR who in re-imagining and reconfiguring legal thought, principles, 
justice and the construct of time, and overriding the fixity of territory 
produced a protective outcome. 
However, whilst the ECtHR held that Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi were 
indeed eligible to protection under the ECHR they, like the British courts, 
remained mute about the wider political context in which the men were 
detained.  The two men, after all, were detained in Basra by the British 
military88 without trial for several years “for imperative reasons of security” 
and it was not until the last moment that it was decided that they were 
allegedly involved in these murders and therefore treated as criminal 
detainees.89 The conditions of their detention by the British military were as 
Mazin Younis of the Iraqi League, describes “...a mini-Guantanamo in 
southern Iraq, outside the boundaries of both Iraqi and British legal 
jurisdiction.”90  The two men were kept in solitary confinement where they 
alleged they were subjected to deliberate sleep deprivation, extreme heat, 
arbitrary body searches and physical abuse.91 Then, when the British 
authorities made it clear that they were going to simply disregard the 
Strasbourg injunctive ruling they were turned over to the Iraqi authorities. The 
86 A Sarat (ed) Law, Violence and the  Possibility of Justice (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2002) p 53. 
87 D Cornell “From the Lighthouse: The Promise of Redemption and the Possibility of 
Legal Interpretation”, 11 Cardozo Law Review 1687, 1709 (1990). 
88 Morning Star March 3rd 2010. 
89 The Independent September 11th 2009. 
90 The Independent September 11th 2009. 
91 Morning Star, March 3rd 2010. 
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Courts, in the main part, avoided the factual realities of the experience of the 
men affected, and the consequences of any judgement.92  
 
THE FATE OF THE JURISDICTION QUESTION AND THE 
MEN 
 
As Shiner somewhat ironically remarks, “We went into Iraq on the basis 
that we would stand for the rule of law.”93 The ECtHR decision in this case 
still leaves the question of territoriality unanswered. The two men currently 
remain in custody, in Rusafa 1 prison94 in Bahgdad.  On 12th January 2010 
their case was been sent back by the Court of Cassation to the investigative 
chamber for a renewed investigation.  Since then their lawyers have had no 
further information. With regard to the IHT their lawyers have been informed 
that it was decided by the Chief Trial Judge that the death penalty is no longer 
92 This was not true in Al-Skeini and the House of Lords did albeit  briefly recognise 
the suffering  of Iraqi civilians. Lord Carswell [93] “My Lords, it is a sad but 
inescapable consequence of armed conflict that lives will be lost. Unhappily, some of 
the persons killed will be peaceable civilians caught in cross-fire. Others will have 
been shot by members of the armed forces involved, and the extent of the justification 
for shooting them which may be advanced will vary enormously with the 
circumstances. One of the appeals before the House concerned such an innocent 
civilian, and it cannot even be determined on the evidence presently available which 
group fired the shot which killed her. In four of the appeals the victims were shot by 
members of the British armed forces. As is very commonly the case in such 
situations, the versions of the facts retailed by witnesses differ markedly. The soldiers 
maintain that they were or reasonably thought themselves to be under attack, and so 
were within the rules of engagement. Civilian witnesses aver, however, that the 
victims were harmless and uninvolved citizens and that the shootings were 
unjustified. The sixth case is wholly different: Mr Baha Mousa died as a result of 
appalling maltreatment in a prison occupied and run by British military personnel. His 
treatment cannot for a moment be defended, but due to a regrettable paucity of 
evidence it has not proved possible to bring to justice those responsible for his death.” 
93 Law Society Gazette (2009) 14 June 2009 “Interview – Phil Shiner: Fighting the 
good fight”. 
94 Sam Dagher, in A report that details torture at Rusafa - April 27, 2010,states, 
“...at least 505 cases of torture were documented in Iraqi prisons in 2009, according to 
a report released by the state department in March.” see 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/nea/136069.htm
See also Human Rights Watch 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/04/27/iraq-detainees-describe-torture-secret-jail 
“Detainees in a secret Baghdad detention facility were hung upside-down, deprived of 
air, kicked, whipped, beaten, given electric shocks, and sodomized, Human Rights 
Watch said today. Iraq should thoroughly investigate and prosecute all government 
and security officials responsible” 
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an available sentence with the result that the charges were amended on July 
29th 2009 and according to the Iraq Government “the death penalty is not an 
appropriate penalty for those charges.”95
Meanwhile the territoriality question has also been considered in the 
context of British troops serving in Iraq.96 In R (Smith v MoD)97 following 
the death of Private Jason Smith on August 13th 2003 from hyperthermia-
heatstroke while serving in Iraq as a private soldier with the Territorial 
Army, the Supreme Court considered to what extent British soldiers 
serving in Iraq are protected by the European Convention on Human 
Rights and whether the inquest on Jason Smith should comply with Article 
2 of the Convention. The Supreme Court, (Lord Phillips of Worth 
Matravers, President, Lord Hope of Craighead, Deputy President, Lord 
Rodger of Earlsferry, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, Baroness Hale of 
Richmond, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, Lord Mance, Lord 
Collins of Mapesbury and Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore) by a majority of 6 to 
3 (Lady Hale, Lord Mance and Lord Kerr dissenting in part) overturned a 
ruling of the Court of Appeal that held soldiers on active service outside the 
UK were indeed entitled to the protection of Convention rights, and found 
that they were not so protected (although found that an inquest should 
comply with Art 2). Considering the question of territoriality they 
concluded that they were bound by the decision of the House of Lords in 
Gentle,98 a case in which Gordon Gentle and Geoffrey Clarke were killed by 
a roadside bomb on June 28th 2004 – in ‘friendly fire’ so called – whilst 
serving in Iraq. Lord Brown concluded in Gentle: 
[68] No member of the committee could fail to be moved by the plight 
of these appellants and others like them, the mothers of soldiers killed 
on active service in Iraq. Your Lordships naturally recognise too that 
the appellants' suffering is the greater because of their understandable 
concern that the invasion may not have been lawful in the first place. 
But however sympathetic your Lordships may be to the appellants' 
plea for a public inquiry to address and resolve the questions that so 
trouble them—most notably perhaps, whether the invasion was lawful 
under international law, how the Attorney General came to his opinion 
that it was, and whether perhaps the government was not in any event 
intent upon hostilities—your Lordships could only order such an 
inquiry if art 2 of the European Convention for the Protection of 
95 I am grateful to the legal team at PIL for providing me with the latest information 
on these two men. 
96 R (Gentle) v Prime Minister [2008] UKHL 20, [2008] 1 AC 1356. 
97 See above n 4. 
98 See above n 96. 
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Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (as set out in Sch 1 to 
the Human Rights Act 1998) requires it. [69] Each of your Lordships 
has reached the clear conclusion that the appellants' argument for an 
inquiry under art 2 must fail. That too was the conclusion reached by 
Collins J at first instance (who cannot be criticised for refusing 
permission to claim judicial review on the ground that it was 
unarguable) and by the Court of Appeal (who expressly granted the 
necessary permission not on the basis that the claim had any real 
prospect of success but rather because it thought there was compelling 
reason to hear it).[70] It is impossible to argue that art 2 of the 
convention was ever intended or is now apt to guarantee or police 
compliance by member states with art 2(4) of the Charter of the 
United Nations.”99
 
It is clear that the applicants in Gentle, were also concerned with wider 
questions including; the “manifest absurdity” of the foraging by the UK into 
other territories, on this occasion Iraq; trumped up global crime thriller tales 
of weapons of mass destruction; stockpiling in bunkers, and nuclear weapons 
that could destroy in 45 minutes. Notwithstanding the importance of these 
questions and concerns the fate of Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi is still 
undetermined even after the decision of the ECtHR and in Smith, (if appealed) 
the question of territory is still yet be concluded by the ECtHR. As Lord Hope  
said, “A decision that the extra-territorial jurisdiction should be extended that 
far in this case would be likely to have profound consequences for other 
member states....and for the court itself. A decision of that kind is best left to 
Strasbourg.”100 
99 [2008] 3 All ER 1 at 26. 
100 Smith  see above n 4 at para 92. 
